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In this work we give a (n, n)-threshold protocol for sequential secret sharing of quantum informa-
tion for the first time. By sequential secret sharing we refer to a situation where the dealer is not
having all the secrets at the same time, at the beginning of the protocol; however if the dealer wishes
to share secrets at subsequent phases she/he can realize it with the help of our protocol. First of all
we present our protocol for three parties and later we generalize it for the situation where we have
more (n > 3) parties. Interestingly, we show that our protocol of sequential secret sharing requires
less amount of quantum as well as classical resource as compared to the situation wherein existing
protocols are repeatedly used. Further in a much more realistic situation, we consider the sharing
of qubits through two kinds of noisy channels, namely the phase damping channel (PDC) and the
amplitude damping channel (ADC). When we carry out the sequential secret sharing in the presence
of noise we observe that the fidelity of secret sharing at the kth iteration is independent of the effect
of noise at the (k − 1)th iteration. In case of ADC we have seen that the average fidelity of secret
sharing drops down to 1
2
which is equivalent to a random guess of the quantum secret. Interestingly,
we find that by applying weak measurements one can enhance the average fidelity. This increase of
the average fidelity can be achieved with certain trade off with the success probability of the weak
measurements.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
For a long time quantum entanglement (”spooky ac-
tion at a distance”) [1] was only of philosophical interest
until people had found out various ways of utilizing it
as a resource for information processing protocols like
quantum teleportation [2], quantum super-dense coding,
entanglement broadcasting and quantum cryptography
[3, 4].
In quantum cryptography when we work with quantum
systems, entanglement probes to be an useful resource in
carrying out various protocols. Quantum secret sharing
is no exception to it. In a nut shell, secret sharing refers
to a situation where the sender shares a secret message
between other parties in such a way that none of them
can reveal the secret without the collaboration of others.
In quantum secret sharing (QSS) [4, 5] generally we
deal with the problem of sharing of both classical as
well as quantum secrets. This is done by using quan-
tum resources like entangled states; mostly pure entan-
gled state. These protocols include various attempts on
tightening the security in presence of eaves droppers. It
is not necessary that we always require three qubit en-
tangled state as a resource for the most simplest secret
sharing protocols. Karlsson et.al.[6] showed that similar
quantum secret sharing protocols using bipartite pure en-
tangled states also exist. However in general research was
carried out mainly investigating the concept of quantum
secret sharing using tripartite pure entangled states and
multipartite states like graph states [7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 20]
as resources. More precisely when we talk about multi-
qubit secret sharing, we generally talk about a situation
where the dealer wants to send multiple secrets; is a QSS
scheme to various reconstructors. Apart from classical
and quantum secret sharing, protocols have been given
to share semi-quantum secrets using entangled states as
the resource [21].
Recently in the reference [22], it was shown that quan-
tum secret sharing is possible even with bipartite two
qubit mixed states formed due to the transmission of
qubits through noisy environment. In a realistic situa-
tion, the secret sharing of classical or quantum informa-
tion will involve the transmission of qubits through noisy
environment. As a result of which the resource state
will become a mixed-state and the secret sharing will no
longer be a deterministic one. In reference [23], authors
proposed a protocol for secret sharing of classical infor-
mation in the presence of such noise. In different works
like [24, 25, 26, 27], it has been shown that quantum se-
cret sharing is not only a mere theoretical concept, but
also an experimental possibility.
In another piece of work authors have investigated the
revocation of quantum secret back to the dealer and rout-
ing quantum information to different receivers in a net-
work [28]. In the long run quantum secret sharing is
also an important area to study in various quantum net-
works (QNet) as in recent times researchers have seen
that both classical as well as quantum information can
be transferred elegantly through quantum networks [29].
It is quite well-known that environmental interactions
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2incurring loss of fidelity of the shared secret is an ubiqui-
tous process and unless controlled using well-formulated
schemes can reduce a shared secret in a pure state to
one in maximally mixed state during the reconstruction
phase. Hence it becomes imperative to devise schemes
of improving the fidelity of shared secret. In references
[10, 11, 12, 13], authors have suggested that one can
apply weak measurements [16] to protect the fidelity of
quantum states subjected to decoherence through an am-
plitude damping channel (ADC) and this technique is
even shown to be practically implementable. Recently in
[14], authors have shown how efficiently one can employ
the technique of weak measurement with post selection
and its reversal to improve the fidelity of teleportation
through an ADC. They also show how to exploit the
power of post selection [16] in weak measurements to
work with sub-ensemble of the initial states and hence
reduce the suppression of decoherence of the transmitted
qubits.
In this work we have given a protocol for sequential
multi qubit secret sharing. This sequential secret shar-
ing is useful when the dealer is not having all the se-
crets at the beginning of the protocol and wishes to send
the secrets at subsequent stages. By our protocol one
can achieve sequential secret sharing using lesser num-
ber of qubits and classical bits of communication than
any other existing quantum secret sharing protocols when
performed repeatedly. We have also considered a realistic
situation when the qubits are transferred from the dealer
to other parties through noisy quantum channel. In that
case we have seen that the fidelity of secret sharing at
the kth iteration is independent of the effect of noise at
the (k − 1)th iteration. Finally we employ the technique
of weak measurement with post selection and its rever-
sal to improve the fidelity of the shared secret under the
effect of ADC. For any given input state parameters and
strength of decoherence channel, we find out for what val-
ues of strength parameters of weak measurement and re-
verse weak measurement will help one to gain maximum
fidelity of reconstructing the shared secret. We also show
how the success probability of such an improvement tech-
nique decreases with increase in strength of weak mea-
surement and that of the decoherence channel.
QUANTUM SEQUENTIAL SECRET SHARING
IN THE ABSENCE OF NOISE
In this section, we present a protocol by which Alice
(the dealer) will securely share the secrets ψ1, ψ2, ....ψm
among n parties at various stages of the protocol. By
this we refer to a situation where the dealer is not hav-
ing all the secrets at the beginning of the protocol. So
he/she shares them at subsequent stages depending on
the availability of the secrets.
Sequential Secret Sharing with three Parties
In this subsection we begin with three parties, where
Alice is the dealer and Bob and Charlie are the receivers.
Alice wants to share the secrets |ψi〉 = αi|0 〉1 + βi|1 〉1 ,
(where |α2i | + |β2i | = 1 and i is from 1 to m) at the
ith iteration of the protocol, to both Bob and Charlie.
However to do so Alice needs to share a quantum re-
source with the other two parties. In order to prepare
this resource state Alice starts with a Bell state, say
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
{|00 〉23 + |11 〉23 }. The combined system of
the Bell state and the secret |ψ1〉 = α1|0 〉+β1|1 〉 , avail-
able to her at the first iteration is given by,
|ψ1〉|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(α1|000〉123 + α1|011〉123)
+
1√
2
(β1|100〉123 + β1|111〉123) . (1)
Now Alice carries out a XOR operation between qubits
1 and 2 to obtain the three qubit entangled state
|Ψin〉 = 1√
2
(α1|000〉123 + α1|011〉123
+β1|110〉123 + β1|101〉123). (2)
Then Alice keeps the qubit 2 with herself and sends the
remaining qubits 1 and 3 to Charlie and Bob respectively.
Here we consider the transfer of qubits to take place in an
idealistic situation where the medium of transfer is free
of noise. The three qubit entangled state shared between
them can be re-written as
|Ψin〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉2{|+〉1(α1|0〉3 + β1|1〉3) +
|−〉1(α1|0〉3 − β1|1〉3)}+ |1〉2{|+〉1(α1|1〉3 +
β1|0〉3) + |−〉1(α1|1〉3 − β1|0〉3)}]. (3)
After that Alice measures her qubit in the computa-
tional basis {|0〉, |1〉} and Charlie measures his qubit in
{|+〉, |−〉} basis. At this point, Alice does not tell ei-
ther Bob or Charlie about her measurement outcomes.
This implies that the single-qubit density matrices of
both Bob’s and Charlie’s qubits are (1/2)I, where I is
the 2× 2 identity matrix. Thus at this stage of the pro-
tocol neither Bob nor Charlie has any information about
Alice’s qubit. Unlike other protocols, it is interesting to
note that in our protocol we are carrying out single qubit
measurements at two different locations instead of two
qubit Bell measurement. Once the measurement is over
from Alice’s side the secret is shared between other two
parties, Bob and Charlie. However neither of them can
reveal the secret without the collaboration of the other
party. This completes the sharing of Alice’s secret. Now
if Bob wants to reveal the secret, then both Alice and
Charlie have to send their measurement outcomes to Bob
in form of one classical bit. Depending on the outcomes
3of Charlie and Alice, Bob can reveal the secret by ap-
plying appropriate set of unitary transformations. This
set of unitary transformations is shown in the following
(TABLE I).
TABLE I: Sharing of quantum secrets
Outcomes of Alice and Charlie Unitary Transformations
|0〉, |+〉 I
|0〉, |−〉 σz
|1〉, |+〉 σx
|1〉, |−〉 −i σy
However if Alice wishes to carry out further secret shar-
ing, Charlie needs to send his qubit to Alice. On receiving
the qubit from Charlie, Alice applies the unitary transfor-
mation to convert it into |0〉 state. In addition to that at
each iteration Alice needs the state 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). With
this single qubit state and the state obtained from Char-
lie she applies XOR operation to re-create a Bell pair
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
{|00〉23 + |11〉23}. Then she follows the same
steps to carry out further secret sharing. The key point
of the protocol is that in order to carry out sequential se-
cret sharing, at the end of each iteration Alice needs the
supply of the qubit 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) along with the qubit
transferred by Charlie.
Sequential Secret Sharing with Multi-parties
In this subsection, we extend our protocol for a situa-
tion where we have more than three parties and consider
a much more generalized condition having n parties other
than the dealer herself. The protocol for multi party se-
cret sharing is mainly a natural extension of our protocol
for three parties. However the resource state required for
secret sharing in this case is an n+1 qubit pure entangled
state given by,
|Ψn+1in 〉 =
1√
2
(αi|000..0〉123..(n+1) + αi|011..1〉123..(n+1)
+βi|110..0〉123..(n+1) + βi|101..1〉123..(n+1)),(4)
where αi and βi are the input state parameters.
This state is obtained by Alice after performing a XOR
operation on the secret available to her at the first iter-
ation with any one of the qubits of the n qubit GHZ
state (|GHZ 〉n = 1√2 [|000...0〉+ |111...1〉]). Alice mea-
sures the second qubit in {|0〉, |1〉} basis and distributes
the qubit such that the party who is supposed to recon-
struct the secret (say Bob) is given the 1st qubit. In the
reconstruction phase all the other parties have to measure
their qubits in {|+〉, |−〉} basis and convey their results
to Bob. If Alice wishes to go for further secret shar-
ing the qubits are to be returned back to her by others
except Bob. She applies the appropriate unitary trans-
formation to convert them to |0〉 state and uses the qubit
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) along with these n− 1 qubits to perform a
chained XOR. This results in a resource state given by,
1√
2
∣∣∣000...0︸ ︷︷ ︸〉
n
+
∣∣∣100...0︸ ︷︷ ︸〉
n

XOR−→ 1√
2
∣∣∣000...0︸ ︷︷ ︸〉
n
+
∣∣∣111...1︸ ︷︷ ︸〉
n
 . (5)
Resource Requirements
We have n parties and m secrets to be shared. If
we use the existing protocols repeatedly then we would
need m(n + 1) number (which grows quadratically) of
qubits [4]. However, with the above protocol we need
n + 1 qubits for the first round and only two more in
each of the subsequent rounds. Therefore we only need
n + 1 + 2(m − 1) = 2m + n − 1 (which grows lin-
early) qubits. The difference between the resource re-
quirements of the existing protocols and our protocol is
m(n+1)−(2m+n−1) = (m−1)(n−1) ≥ 0, ∀m,n ≥ 1.
This shows that the resource requirement for our pro-
tocol is strictly less than that of the existing protocols
when used repeatedly for sequential sharing of quantum
secrets. In the Fig. 1, we compare the requirement of
resource qubits in our protocol with the existing ones.
The sharp rise of the greenish-yellow plane describing the
qubit requirement with existing protocols demonstrates
the rapid growth in the amount of required qubits with
increase in values of m as well as n, while the low rise
of the orange plane describing the required number of
qubits in our case shows that the requirement of qubits
here is strictly lesser. Moreover, the rapid increase in
separation between the two planes with higher values of
m and n explicitly expresses the utility of our protocol
over the existing ones for performing sequential secret
sharing in terms of resource requirements. Apart from
this our protocol also requires lesser number of classical
bits to be communicated to the secret re-constructor. It
takes nm bits of classical communication in the earlier
case, whereas it takes (n− 1)m bits in our protocol.
QUANTUM SEQUENTIAL SECRET SHARING
IN THE PRESENCE OF NOISE
In this section, we consider a more realistic situation
where three parties share a three qubit mixed entangled
state instead of a three qubit pure entangled state as
a resource. Similarly, here also, we start with a pure
entangled state |Ψin〉, initially with all the qubits with
4FIG. 1: Comparison of qubit requirements of our protocol (orange
plane) with the existing ones (greenish-yellow plane).
Alice. Now Alice keeps the second qubit with herself and
sends the remaining qubits (1 & 3) to Charlie and Bob.
She sends them through a noisy quantum channel. Since
practically no channel is completely noise-free, such an
analysis in the absence of noise is imperative. We study
our protocol under the effects of both phase damping
channel(PDC) and amplitude damping channel(ADC).
Transmission of qubits through a PDC
In the first subsection, we study the effects of PDC
on the secret sharing fidelity when the qubits are sent
through this channel. The action of a PDC are given by
the set of three Kraus operators, namely, K0 =
√
1− qI,
K1 =
√
q |0〉 〈0|, and K2 = √q |1〉 〈1|; where q(0 ≤ q ≤ 1)
is the channel strength [15]. The action of the Kraus
operators, describing the PDC, on the two qubits results
in a three qubit mixed entangled state, ρout are as follows,
ρout =
∑
i
∑
j
[(Ki ⊗ I ⊗Kj)ρin(K†i ⊗ I† ⊗K†j )] (6)
where i, j  {0, 1, 2}. Here the Kraus operators acts
on the two qubits sent to Bob and Charlie by Alice.
These qubits are the ones which are subjected to envi-
ronmental interaction and thus undergo phase damping.
In the reconstruction phase, Alice measures her qubit in
{|0〉, |1〉} basis and Charlie measures in {|+〉, |−〉} basis.
After these measurements Bob’s state collapses to one
of the four states, ρa,bout (with a ∈ {0, 1} representing Al-
ice’s measurement outcome and b ∈ {+,−}, representing
Charlie’s measurement outcome). These four states are
given by,
ρ0,+out = α
2 |0〉 〈0|+ β2 |1〉 〈1|+
(1− q)2αβ |1〉 〈0|+ (1− q)2αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ0,−out = α
2 |0〉 〈0|+ β2 |1〉 〈1| −
(1− q)2αβ |1〉 〈0| − (1− q)2αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ1,+out = α
2 |1〉 〈1|+ β2 |0〉 〈0|+
(1− q)2αβ |1〉 〈0|+ (1− q)2αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ1,−out = α
2 |1〉 〈1|+ β2 |0〉 〈0| −
(1− q)2αβ |1〉 〈0| − (1− q)2αβ |0〉 〈1| . (7)
Since the channel through which the qubits are sent is
a noisy channel, the qubit obtained by Bob is no longer
the desired qubit but a single qubit mixed state ρa,bout. At
this point we define the fidelity of quantum secret sharing
as the overlap between the original secret and the nearest
possible state obtained during the reconstruction phase
after optimizing over all possible complex unitaries. The
expression for the secret sharing fidelity given by,
Maximize
U
〈
ψ
∣∣∣Uρa,boutU†∣∣∣ψ〉 (8)
where U represents complex unitaries.
In our case, after doing optimization over all possible
complex unitary matrices, we find that the unitaries that
will take the state obtained at Bob’s side are the same set
of unitaries that are given in TABLE I and the fidelity
of secret sharing is given by,
FPD = α
4 + 2(1− q)2α2β2 + β4. (9)
The average fidelity obtained after averaging over all
input parameter α2 is given by,
FPD = 1− 2q
3
+
q2
3
. (10)
In FIG. 2 we plot the average fidelity (FPD) against
the channel strength (q). It is evident from the figure
itself that when we have no noise in the channel, that is
q = 0, we have FPD = 1. This ensures the fact that in
the absence of noise we can always do perfect secret shar-
ing. However, for maximum noise in the phase damping
channel (q = 1) we have the value of the average fidelity
to be 23 . This result is analogous to teleportation with
classical channel and implies that for full phase damping
case these channels become classical: no phase informa-
tion can be transmitted, but a classical bit can be reliably
communicated [30].
Transmission of qubits through an ADC
In this subsection, we investigate the process of se-
cret sharing when the qubits are sent through amplitude
damping channel (ADC).
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0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Average Fidelity
FIG. 2: Variation of Average Fidelity of sequential secret sharing with
the PDC parameter(q).
The action of an ADC are given by the set of two Kraus
operators, namely, K0 = |0〉 〈0|+
√
1− p |1〉 〈1|, andK1 =√
p |0〉 〈1|; where p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1) is the channel strength
[15]. The action of the Kraus operators, describing the
ADC, on the two qubits (sent to Bob and Charlie) results
in a three qubit mixed entangled state, ρout.
The four states corresponding to the measurement out-
comes are given by,
ρ0,+out = (α
2 + pβ2) |0〉 〈0|+ (1− p)β2 |1〉 〈1|+
(1− p)αβ |1〉 〈0|+ (1− p)αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ0,−out = (α
2 + pβ2) |0〉 〈0|+ (1− p)β2 |1〉 〈1| −
(1− p)αβ |1〉 〈0| − (1− p)αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ1,+out = (pα
2 + β2) |0〉 〈0|+ (1− p)α2 |1〉 〈1|+
(1− p)αβ |1〉 〈0|+ (1− p)αβ |0〉 〈1|
ρ1,−out = (pα
2 + β2) |0〉 〈0|+ (1− p)α2 |1〉 〈1| −
(1− p)αβ |1〉 〈0| − (1− p)αβ |0〉 〈1| (11)
Depending on measurement outcome of Alice and
Charlie, Bob applies the corresponding unitary transfor-
mations according to the ones given by TABLE I.
Proceeding similar to the above case of PDC, the fi-
delity of quantum secret sharing is obtained by optimiz-
ing over all possible complex unitaries and is given by
FAD = α
2 + (1− p)β2. (12)
Unlike the case of PDC, here we cannot convert all
the four ρa,bout exactly to ρ
0,+
out using unitary operations.
However we can convert them pairwise. By applying the
unitary operations in TABLE I, we end up with two dif-
ferent fidelity expressions. Both these expressions, when
averaged over all possible input states, give rise to the
same average fidelity for the protocol. The average fi-
delity obtained after averaging over all input parameter
α2 is given by
FAD = 1− p
2
(13)
It is evident from the Eq.( 12) that when p = 0 we
have FAD = 1, ensuring the fact that in the absence
of noise we can always do perfect secret sharing. For
p = 1, in presence of full amplitude damping strength
no information can be transmitted over the channel and
the fidelity is 12 corresponding to random guessing. The
output of the channel is always |0〉 regardless of the input.
For both above channels, we observe that in our proto-
col the fidelity of secret sharing in subsequent iterations
remains the same and is independent of the number of
iterations. This is because at each and every iteration
there is reusability of Charlie’s qubit. Though Charlie’s
qubit is affected by noise and will also get further affected
when he sends back his qubit to Alice, this noise is not
going to play a part in the subsequent iterations. This
is because Alice on getting back the qubit from Char-
lie measures it in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} and
transforms it accordingly to the state |0〉 by applying the
appropriate unitary transformation.
IMPROVING THE FIDELITY OF THE SHARED
SECRET USING WEAK MEASUREMENTS
In the previous section we have noticed that in a re-
alistic situation the shared qubits are subjected to deco-
herence due to the presence of noise. This environmental
interaction results in inevitable loss of fidelity of obtain-
ing the shared secret. The reconstructed secret under
noise becomes a mixed state and under certain condi-
tions, for full phase damping channel, the average fidelity
drops to 23 where the phase information is lost and it be-
comes equivalent to transmission over a classical channel.
The case is even worse for full amplitude damping chan-
nel, the average fidelity drops to 12 where it conveys of
no more information than what can be obtained by em-
ploying random guess. Thus, there arises an exigency to
improve the fidelity of reconstructing the shared secret.
The authors in the references [10, 11, 12, 13], have
shown that one can reduce the effect of amplitude damp-
ing decoherence with the help of weak measurement and
reverse quantum measurement (WMRQM) [11]. Re-
cently the authors in [14] show how to improve the fi-
delity of teleportation through noisy channel with the
aid of weak measurements. In this section, we show how
to improve the fidelity of the shared secret in the protocol
of sequential quantum secret sharing under the influence
of damping interactions with the help of weak measure-
ments and post-selection. We find that in the case of
PDC since both the qubit states |0〉 and |1〉 get affected
by decoherence this method of reverse weak measurement
and post-selection cannot be employed to improve the fi-
delity of the shared secret. But in the case of ADC, unlike
6PDC, |0〉 state remains unaltered and hence we find that
the method of WMRQM can be applied to improve the
fidelity of the shared secret.
In this protocol we apply weak measurements and its
reversal, in two stages: one before and other after the
decoherence acts on the system. After preparing the
state represented in Eq.( 2), Alice makes a weak mea-
surement [11, 14] of strength si on the i
th qubit where
i = {1, 3}. The weak measurement here is ensured by
reducing the sensitivity of the detector. On one hand
the detector clicks with probability si if the input qubit
is in state |1〉i and subsequently the protocol fails since
the input state collapses on |1〉i in a irreversible way. On
the other hand the detector never clicks if its in state |0〉i
but it partially biases the input state towards |0〉i which
remains unaffected by the damping interaction given by
Eq.( 6). The measurement operator corresponding to the
detection and non-detection of the qubits are respectively
given by,
Mq,1 =
(
0 0
0
√
sq,
)
(14)
which is irreversible since it doesn’t possess an inverse,
and
Mq,0 =
(
1 0
0
√
1− sq
)
(15)
which is reversible as it has an inverse. Here M†q,0Mq,0 +
M†q,1Mq,1 = I and q = {1, 3} represent the qubit on
which the measurement is being performed. Alice makes
this weak measurement on 1st and 3rd qubit and sends
them to Charlie and Bob respectively.
If ρin be the density matrix corresponding to the pure
state |Ψin〉 in Eq.( 2), then the output state after the
measurement is a mixed state and is denoted by ρWW
ρWW = (M1,0 ⊗ I ⊗M3,0)ρin(M†1,0 ⊗ I† ⊗M†3,0). (16)
For our convenience, we assume the input state param-
eters, α2 = k and β2 = 1− k. The success probability of
the measurement or in other words the detector’s ineffi-
ciency is given by, SP1 = Tr
[
ρWW
]
= 12 (1 + s¯)(1− k¯s),
where s¯ = (1− s) and k¯ = (1− k).
Alice then sends both the qubits (1 and 3) to Charlie
and Bob through the ADC where they suffer decoherence
due to interaction with the environment. Owing to this
effect the mixed state ρWW takes the form,
ρDD =
∑
i
∑
j
[(Ki ⊗ I ⊗Kj)ρWW (K†i ⊗ I† ⊗K†j )] (17)
where i, j = { 0, 1} in the case of ADC.
Lastly, Bob and Charlie perform the reverse quan-
tum measurement [11, 14] Nz,0 (corresponding to Mq,0 in
Eq.( 11) on the qubits received from Alice after suffering
decoherence. The operators for reverse weak measure-
ments are given by,
Nz,0 =
( √
1− rz 0
0 1
)
(18)
where r denotes the reverse quantum measurement
strength and z = {1, 3} denotes the qubit on which mea-
surement is being performed.
The output state, after the measurement, is again a
mixed state and is denoted by ρRR and is given by,
ρRR = (N1,0 ⊗ I ⊗N3,0)ρDD(N†1,0 ⊗ I† ⊗N†3,0) (19)
In this case, the overall success probability,
SP2 =
1
2
(kr¯ − k¯δs¯)(2− (1 + p)r + δs) = Tr [ρRR] (20)
where δ = (pr−1), r¯ = (1−r), s¯ = (1−s) and k¯ = (1−k).
For simplicity, here we assume the measurement
strengths to be uniform, s1 = s3 = s and r1 = r3 = r.
To reconstruct the secret at Bob’s end, Alice measures
her qubit in computational basis {|0 〉 , |1 〉} and Charlie
measures in horizontal basis {|+〉 , |−〉}. After these mea-
surements Bob’s state collapses to one of the four states,
ρa,cout , with a  {0, 1} representing Alice’s measurement
outcomes and c  {+,−}, representing Charlie’s mea-
surement outcomes. Alice and Charlie send their mea-
surement outcome to Bob over classical channel. Just as
before depending on these results, Bob applies the opti-
mal unitary transformations (same as the ones given by
TABLE I), to reconstruct the secret.
We illustrate two cases separately, one when the Alice’s
measurement outcome is |0〉 and the other when its |1〉,
since the expression of the fidelity of the shared secret
obtained in these two cases are not the identical, similar
to the situation when no weak measurement is performed.
Case I. When Alice’s measurement outcome is |0〉, then
the output density matrix, ρ0,+out , is as follows,
 (−1+r)((−1+r)α2+p(−1+s)2β2δ)η − jαβη
− jαβη (−1+p)(−1+s)
2β2δ
η

(21)
where δ = (pr−1), η = (r−1)2α2+(pr−1)2(s−1)2β2
and (p− 1)(r − 1)(s− 1) = j.
The fidelity of the shared secret (FWW0 ), is given by,
FWW0 =
k2r¯2 − k2s¯2p¯δ + kks¯r¯ (2− (1 + s) p− s¯p2r)
kr¯2 + ks¯2δ2
(22)
7where δ = (pr−1), r¯ = (1−r), p¯ = (1−p), k¯ = (1−k) =
β2 and s¯ = (1− s).
In this protocol, the role of forward weak measurement
is to project the input state towards |0〉, which is unaf-
fected by the environmental interaction. One can think of
this as a map from |1〉 to |0〉, which is reversible. Since
we have use a map from |1〉 → |0〉 at beginning so we
need to again use a reverse map i.e., from |0〉 → |1〉 later.
Moreover as the state suffers decoherence in its transit,
we use the optimal strength of reverse quantum measure-
ment which is a function of noise. Thus its crucial that
the optimization should always be done on reverse quan-
tum measurement strength (r) and not on forward one
(s).
To achieve the objective of the protocol one needs
to choose the proper strengths of the weak measure-
ment. The optimum reverse measurement strength ropt
which maximally protects the fidelity of the shared secret
(FWW0 ) is obtained by maximizing Eq.( 22) with respect
to r. The optimum reverse measurement strength, in this
case, is given by
ropt =
1 + (2k − 1)s
f
−
√
− kp¯
2s¯2
(k (p2s¯2 − 1)− p2s¯2) f2 ,(23)
where f = p+2k(1−ps¯)−ps and the range of optimality is
given by the following condition, 0 < p < 1 and 0 < s < 1
and
(
−p+ps
−2−2p+2ps < k <
−1+s
−4+2s or
−1+s
−4+2s < k < 1
)
.
Substituting this expression for ropt, given by Eq.( 23),
in Eq.( 22), in place of r, one can get the expression to
obtain optimal fidelity of the shared secret, F 0opt. Hence,
by averaging over the allowed range of input state pa-
rameter k (as given above), the average optimal fidelity
(F
0
opt) is given by,
F
0
opt(s, p) =
1
8uv2 {(8− ps¯ (ps¯+ 2) (4− 3ps¯))u}
+ 18uv2
{
2p2s¯2v2
(
ln
[
ps¯
(
1− u+ ps¯
(
1 + u− 2
√
2
v − 1
)
+2p2s¯2
√
2
v − 1
)]
− ln [(2− p2s¯2 − 2u) v])} , (24)
for 0 < p < 1 and 0 < s < 1. Here, u =
√
1− p2s¯2 and
v = 1+p−ps. Thus, for a given value of p (or decoherence
channel strength), one can always choose a value of weak
measurement strength (s) within the permitted range,
given by the above condition, to calculate the average
optimal fidelity, F
0
opt.
Substituting the value of ropt, given by Eq.( 23), in
Eq.( 20) for r, one can get the required expression
and calculate the corresponding average optimal success
probability of the process (SP
0
opt) by then integrating
over the prescribed range of input state parameter(k).
The expression of SP
0
opt has been provided in the ap-
pendix of this paper. We observe that as s → 1, SP 0opt
tends to zero (becomes negligibly small) which coheres
with results observed by the authors in [14]. A quick cal-
culation shows that for p = 1, Eq.( 23) gives ropt = 1.
Now when these values are substituted in Eq.( 20) we get
SP2 = 0 and again it can be shown that SP
0
opt becomes
zero for p = 1. These results necessarily prove that for
full damping strength (p = 1) in the channel, the fidelity
can never be improved. Moreover we find that for p < 1,
F
0
opt given by Eq.( 24) increases with s but remains less
than 1 for s < 1 and for s = 1 the value of F
0
opt be-
comes undefined. Thus, for p > 0, the value F
0
opt = 1 is
impossible to obtain.
In FIG. 3, we show how F
0
opt varies with weak mea-
surement strength (s) at different values of decoherence
strength (p) and thus remains protected by WMRQM.
Here, we simultaneously compare how the SP
0
opt decays
rapidly with increase in weak measurement strength (s).
We also note that SP
0
opt is inversely proportional to the
increase in the decoherence strength (p). This compari-
son clearly illustrates that the increase in average optimal
fidelity comes at the cost of decrease in average optimal
success probability of the process.
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FIG. 3. Variation of Average Optimal Fidelity (F
0
opt) and corresponding Success Probability (SP
0
opt) with Weak
Measurement Strength (s) for few given values of Decoherence Strength (p).
Case II. When Alice’s measurement outcome is |1〉, the
output density matrix, ρ1,+out after applying the unitary
transformation σx, is given by,
1
1− pr
(
p¯α2 p¯αβ
p¯αβ 1− pr + p¯α2
)
(25)
where p¯ = (1− p).
For our convenience, we again assume that the input
state parameters, α2 = k and β2 = 1 − k. In this case,
the final fidelity of the shared secret (FWW1 ), is given by,
FWW1 =
p(k + r − kr)− 1
pr − 1 . (26)
In this case, we obtain the average probability of suc-
cess by first substituting s = 0 in Eq.( 20) and then inte-
grating it over the allowed range of input state parameter
(k) and is given by,
SP
1
(r, p) =
1
4
(r + pr − 2)2. (27)
Interestingly, in Eq.( 25) the strength of weak measure-
ment parameter (s) vanishes and the reverse quantum
measurement parameter (r) is the only parameter left to
protect the fidelity. To achieve the objective of the proto-
col one needs to choose proper strengths of reverse mea-
surement. The optimum reverse measurement strength
which maximally protects the fidelity of the shared of
9secret (FWW1 ) is obtained putting r = 1. With this sub-
stitution in Eq.( 26) the optimal fidelity becomes 1, but
the average success probability (SP
1
) in Eq.( 27) corre-
sponding to this case reduces to very small value.
The average fidelity (F
1
) obtained by integrating
Eq.( 26) over the allowed range of input state parameter
(k) and is given by,
F
1
(r, p) =
p+ pr − 2
2pr − 2 (28)
for 0 ≤ p < 1 and 0 ≤ r < 1.
As in Case I, here also we observe that as r → 1,
SP
1
becomes negligibly small. A quick calculation again
shows that for p = 1, the use of optimal value of reverse
measurement strength (r = 1) in Eq.( 28) gives F
1
=
1 as discussed earlier, but correspondingly we also get
SP
1
= 0 from Eq.( 27) with these values. Now if instead
non-optimal value of r is used in the above case, then
F
1
from Eq.( 28) becomes 1/2 for all (r < 1) which is
the same result as obtained for p = 1 when no WMRQM
was employed. Thus, this result essentially shows that for
full damping strength (p = 1) in the channel, the average
fidelity cannot be improved and in particularly the value
F
1
= 1 is impossible to obtain. For p < 1, we can obtain
F
1
= 1 using optimal reverse measurement strength of
r = 1 but with very low yet finite probability of success.
This observation is not in terms with the results in Case
I, since the s parameter which used to lower down the
success probability in Case I is absent here and for s = 1,
F
0
opt was undefined but here for r = 1, F
1
is defined and
has a finite value of 1.
To analyze what values of reverse measurement
strength (r) will give better average success probabili-
ties (SP
1
) as well as increase the average fidelity of the
shared secret, next we plot F
1
varying with strength of
reverse measurement (r) and correspondingly compare
the variation of SP
1
with r in FIG. 4 for few different
values of decoherence strength (p).
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FIG. 4. Variation of Average Fidelity (F
1
) and corresponding Success Probability (SP
1
) with Reverse Measurement Strength
(r) for few given values of Decoherence Strength (p).
In general for this protocol we find that in Case I the
average optimal fidelity (F
0
opt) stays close to
3
5 for very
high decoherence strength even at s = 0. Again in Case
II we observe that the parameter of weak measurement
strength (s) vanishes in Eq.( 26) yet the reverse quantum
measurement parameter (r) alone well protects fidelity
from decoherence effects and with good enough success
probability of the process. This clearly illustrates that
the role of reverse quantum measurement (r) in protect-
ing the fidelity of the shared secret is more prominent
than the forward one.
Finally, in TABLE II, we compare the improvement
of average fidelities from the case when no WMRQM is
employed to the ones when WMRQM is employed and
also note the corresponding average success probabili-
ties of obtaining such improvement at different values
of decoherence channel strength (p). We do this analysis
corresponding to both measurement outcomes of Alice
(Case I & II). Interestingly enough we observe that in
Case I for very low values of decoherence strength (p) and
weak measurement strength (s) the method of WMRQM
is not very helpful in improving of the average fidelity
of the shared secret than in the general case when no
such WMRQM is employed. However for higher values of
weak measurement strength (s) and for channels not fully
noisy (p < 1) the improvement in average fidelity of the
shared secret can be obtained using WMRQM with small
11
enough success probability of the process. In Case II,
we find that the improvement effects of this method are
more prominent for lower values of decoherence strength
as compared to Case I, than for the higher values. And
we also note that the success probabilities of obtaining
such improvements are comparatively much higher here
than the former case. Its is quite evident from these val-
ues that there is certainly a direct trade off between the
improvement of average fidelity and the corresponding
success probability and this trade off increases with in-
crease in the strength of weak (or reverse) measurement
as well as with increase of noise in the channel.
TABLE II: Comparison of trade off between the increase of Average Fidelities and corresponding Success
Probabilities, for both the cases, for given values of Decoherence Parameter and Weak/Reverse Measurement
Strength
Decoherence Average Fidelity Weak or Reverse Average Average
Strength without WMRQM Measurement Fidelity Success Probability
p FAD (p) Strength: s or r Case I: F
0
opt (s, p) Case II: F
1
(r, p) Case I: SP
0
opt (s, p) Case II: SP
1
(r, p)
0.15 0.925
0.25 0.91 0.94 0.41 0.733
0.45 0.93 0.96 0.219 0.549
0.65 0.95 0.97 0.088 0.392
0.85 0.98 0.99 0.016 0.261
0.5 0.75
0.25 0.76 0.79 0.156 0.66
0.45 0.81 0.82 0.08 0.439
0.65 0.86 0.87 0.031 0.263
0.85 0.93 0.93 0.006 0.131
0.85 0.575
0.25 0.67 0.6 0.016 0.591
0.45 0.72 0.62 0.008 0.341
0.65 0.8 0.67 0.003 0.159
0.85 0.89 0.77 0.001 0.046
Note: Here Case I & II refers to the two cases considered by us corresponding to the two measurement
outcomes of Alice, |0〉 and |1〉 respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
In a nutshell, in this work we have given a protocol for
sequential secret sharing of quantum information. Ini-
tially we have given the protocol for three parties and
then we have generalized it for (n > 3) parties. We
also explicitly show how our protocol is more efficient in
terms of resource requirements, both classical and quan-
tum, over the existing protocols for the purspose shar-
ing secrets in a sequential (deferred) manner. Not only
that, we have further considered a much more realistic
situation, where we have shared the qubits through two
kinds of noisy channels, namely the phase damping chan-
nel (PDC) and the amplitude damping channel (ADC).
When we carry out the sequential secret sharing in the
presence of noise we observe that the fidelity of secret
sharing at the kth iteration is independent of the effect
of noise at the (k − 1)th iteration. In case of PDC, the
average fidelity ranges from 0.67 to 1, whereas in case of
ADC we have observed that the average fidelity ranges
from 0.5 to 1. In order to enhance the fidelity of secret
sharing in ADC, we have employed the technique of weak
measurement and its reversal. The improvement of the
average fidelity comes at the cost of drop in success prob-
ability of the process. By applying WMRQM, for higher
values of weak measurement strength (s) and for chan-
nels not fully noisy (p < 1) we are able to improve the
average fidelity of the shared secret with small enough
success probability of the process. We have also shown
that for p = 1, the average fidelity of secret sharing can
never be improved and more particularly the value of the
average fidelity equal to 1 is impossible to obtain.
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APPENDIX
SP
0
opt(s, p) = (p− 1)2px2
√
hpx
{
2− 2x− p (p2 − 1− 2p+ x+ px− p2x)+ s{−2 + p(2 + 6p+ p2x− 4px− x− 4p2
+s(6p2 − 1− 6p+ 2px− 3p2x+ s (2p− 4p2 + sp2 + p2x)))} − 2x√pz{8 + p(4(5s+ 3)− 5p+ 10p2
−4p3 + 2p4 + p5 + s(−10p− 15p2 + 11p3 − 9p4 − 10p5 + s(p3 + 6p4 + 5p5 − s(p4 + p5))))))}+ 8p(1 + p)
x(px(px− 1)) 32 (x+ y)ArcTanh [1 + px] + (−
√
−p5y − 2
√
−p7y +
√
−p9y + p3(3 + s(−13 + 3(7− 5s)s))
√
pz + 5p5
(
1 + s2
)2
x
√
pz + 3
√
p9z + 4
√
p11z + 2px2(
√−py − 3√pz) + p2(−7√pz + s(15√pz
+s(−7√−py − 9√pz + s√pz)))− p4s(4√−py + 11√pz + s(−14√pz + s(4√−py + 6√pz + s√pz)))
+s(5(
√
−p5y +
√
−p7y) + s(−3
√
−p7y + 6
√
−p9y + s(3
√
−p5y −
√
−p7y + s(
√
−p7y +
√
−p9y + 4
√
p7z
+s(
√
p9z − 4
√
p11z))))))Log [4] + 256p7(1 + p)4x7y(2 + px)3(3px− 1)(1 + 3px)(px(1 + px)− 2)z5
+(−2p√pz − 5
√
p5z − 3
√
p7z +
√
p9z +
√
p11z − s(−3(
√
p5z +
√
p7z −
√
p9z −
√
p11z) + (s− 3)s
(
√
p9z +
√
p11z))) Log [p− ps] Log [ 21+p−ps ] Log [1 + p− ps] Log [1 + 1−1+px ] Log [pz] + 4(1 + p)(x+ y)(−py)
3
2
(Log [−2i(−1 +
√
1− p2x2)]− 4x3(p5x2√pz − 2
√
p5z − 3
√
p7z + s(
√
p7z −
√
p9z + s
√
p9z))
Log [2 + px] Log [i(−√−py +√pz)])))}
/
(8(1 + p)(1 + p(−1 + s))4(2 + p(−1 + s))(p(−1 + p(−1 + s))(−1 + s)) 32 )
where x = s− 1, z = x(px− 1), h = (p(s− 1)− 1)(1 + p2(s− 3)(s− 1)) and y = x(px+ 1).
